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ABSTRACT 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and U.S. Energy Markets 
 
by 
 
Kangil Lee, Master of Science 
 
Utah State University, 2014 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Man-Keun Kim 
Department: Applied Economics 
 
There have been numerous studies in relation to carbon permit prices in the greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions trading market and energy markets. Most previous studies have focused on 
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) since its creation in 2005. Notable 
findings are 1) the carbon permit price in the EU ETS and energy prices are closely interrelated, 
and 2) crude oil and electricity prices are the main drivers of the carbon permit price. Our 
attention moves to another emissions trading market in the U.S., the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI), which began in 2009 for nine northeastern US states. The RGGI is the first 
regulatory carbon cap-and-trade system in the U.S. To my best knowledge, there is no rigorous 
empirical study about the RGGI.  
A primary research objective is to investigate a mutual relationship among the RGGI 
carbon permit price and energy prices in the northeastern U.S. I have applied the Lag Augmented 
Vector Autoregression (LA-VAR) model to capture the mutual relationship among the RGGI, 
electricity, natural gas, and coal prices. Impulse response function (IRF) results suggest that an 
interrelation between the RGGI carbon permit price and electricity market exists, although it is 
iv 
 
weak and statistically insignificant. This implies that both markets are not closely attached. IRF 
also suggests that the natural gas price has positive impacts on the RGGI carbon permit price but 
the natural gas price is not influenced by the RGGI market. In addition, IRF tells us that the 
RGGI price and coal price are negatively related each other.  
Key findings designate that, unlike the EU ETS, the RGGI market and electricity market 
in the RGGI region are not tied closely, and the natural gas is the main driver of the system in the 
RGGI region. The loose relationship between the two markets can be explained by recent weak 
carbon credit demand, which stems from low GHG emissions. The recent low natural gas prices 
have led to increased fuel switching, which reduces GHG emissions as power companies switch 
from coal to natural gas sources. 
(64 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and Energy Markets in the U.S. 
 
Kangil Lee 
 
The dynamic mutual relationship between the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
carbon permit price and energy prices in the U.S. is examined. Results show that the RGGI and 
electricity markets are not closely linked, although the carbon permit price is usually closely 
interrelated with energy prices. The loose relationship between the RGGI and electricity markets 
can be explained by the recent low carbon credit demand which stems from the low greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions existent in the particular area covered by the RGGI. The low GHG 
emissions result from fuel switching due to recent low natural gas prices. Unlike the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme, natural gas is the key driver of the RGGI system.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
1.1.1. Climate Change and International Efforts 
The Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, indicating possible adverse impacts caused by 
global climate change. The Kyoto Protocol is the first international agreement to reduce the 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG)
1
 by setting binding obligations. The Protocol was adopted 
by Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 
entered into force in 2005. The U.S. has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol but has been trying to 
reduce its GHG emissions. The first period of emission reduction commitments in the Kyoto 
Protocol expired on December 31, 2012. 
A new treaty to limit GHG emissions was established in the 2011 United Nations Climate 
Change Conference held in Durban, South Africa, called the Durban Platform. Negotiators agreed 
to be part of a legally binding treaty to address climate change. The terms of the future treaty are 
to be defined by 2015 and become effective in 2020. The Durban platform is notable insofar as it 
marks the first time developing countries such as China and India have made an obligation to 
reduce GHG emissions. 
1.1.2. Emissions Trading 
Various policy options have been introduced to achieve emission goals in the Kyoto 
protocol and the Durban Platform. Emissions trading, or cap and trade, is the most widely 
                                                     
1
 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stipulates seven GHGs in the 
Kyoto Protocol: CO2, NH4, N2O, HFC, PFC, and SF6. In this study, GHG or carbon refer to CO2, without 
other specific mention. 
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accepted policy option in many countries and regions. Emissions trading is a market-based 
approach to control GHG emission by providing economic incentives. A central authority 
(usually a governmental body) sets a limit or cap on the amount of emissions of GHG. 
The limit or cap is allocated or sold in the form of auction to firms, which represents the 
right to emit GHG. Firms with lower abatement costs will reduce GHG emissions below the cap 
and sell their surplus (permit supply) in the emissions trading market. On the other hand, 
companies with high abatement costs will buy emissions permits (permit demand) from the firms 
who sell the permit in the emissions trading market. The supply and demand will be cleared and 
permit prices will be determined. Through these processes emission targets are achieved at the 
minimum cost. 
The European Union (EU) launched the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
in 2005 to implement their GHG reduction obligations. As of 2013 the EU ETS covers more than 
11,000 factories, power stations, and other installations in all 28 EU member states plus Iceland, 
Norway, and Liechtenstein (European Commission 2013).
2
 The installations regulated by the EU 
ETS are collectively responsible for close to half of the EU's emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
and 40% of its total GHG. The trading volume of the GHG emission permits has grown for the 
last several years.  
Although the U.S. has not ratified the Kyoto protocol, there are three GHG emissions 
trading markets:  the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) and California’s Cap and Trade Program. The CCX has been defunct since the end of 
2010 (Bern 2011) due to low carbon prices. The nine northeastern states in the U.S. started a 
mandatory program to abate GHG emissions in 2009, the RGGI. California started the 
enforceable emissions trading market in 2013.  
                                                     
2
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm 
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1.1.3. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
The RGGI, a regional initiative, is the first regulatory GHG cap and trade system in the 
U.S.  Nine states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont) are now participating. The GHG emissions of that region 
account for about 10% of total US emissions. Power plants with 25 MW or more capacity have a 
carbon reduction obligation under the RGGI. The first permit auction was held in September 
2008, and the first three-year compliance period began on January 1, 2009. The RGGI is a 
relatively small, local market. The amount of total trading volume was 249 million USD in 2011,
3
 
less than 1% of the trading volume in the EU ETS (World Bank 2012).  
1.2. Motivation of Research  
There has been much debate surrounding the relationship between carbon permit prices in 
the GHG emissions trading market and energy markets for electricity, crude oil, coal, and natural 
gas. Most previous studies have focused on the EU ETS since its creation in 2005. These previous 
studies could be categorized into three groups; 1) studies recognizing factors influencing a carbon 
price in the emissions trading market, 2) studies testing the efficiency of the emissions trading 
market, and 3) studies investigating mutual interactions between the carbon price and energy 
prices. Notable findings are that carbon price in the EU ETS and energy prices are closely 
interrelated, and crude oil price and electricity price are the main drivers of the carbon price in the 
EU ETS. 
Our attention moves naturally to another emissions trading market in the U.S., the RGGI. 
To my best knowledge, there is surprisingly no rigorous empirical study to analyze the 
interrelationship between the RGGI market and the energy markets. As mentioned, most 
                                                     
3
 The amount of transaction volume was 120 million tCO2e in 2011. The tCO2e refers to tonnes of carbon 
dioxide equivalent. 
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researchers have paid attention to the EU ETS because the EU ETS is the largest and most 
influential carbon trading market in the world. Also it has amassed the largest volume of 
transaction data including historical carbon prices and trading volumes. On the other hand, the 
RGGI is a small and regional market which has relatively sparse transaction data. One of key 
contributions of this research is to fill this research gap by investigating the dynamic interaction 
between the RGGI and energy markets. In doing so, I identify the main driver(s) of the carbon 
price in the RGGI and characterize the price dynamics in the RGGI and energy markets in the 
region. 
On the other hand, there are voices of concern for the low carbon prices in the EU ETS 
(The Economist 2013; The Guardian 2013). The carbon price plummeted in the fourth quarter of 
2011 in the EU ETS. The current carbon price is less than $5/tCO2e (as of December, 2013), 
whereas the former price stayed between $19~$26/tCO2e until around mid-2011. One of the 
reasons for the recent low carbon price is the chronic oversupply of carbon permits (The 
Economist 2013). The EU has been seeking a structural reform of the carbon market, named 
“back-loading,” which would take 900 million tons of carbon allowances off the market now and 
reintroduce it later, to prevent further decline of carbon price (Financial Times 2013). 
The RGGI also has been reporting a low carbon price of around $3.30/tCO2e (as of 
December, 2013) (The RGGI CO2 Allowance Tracking System). The low carbon price in the 
RGGI is a result of different reasons from those of the EU ETS. A leading cause for low carbon 
prices in the RGGI region is a low carbon credit demand. The low carbon credit demand has 
stemmed from the low GHG emissions in the RGGI states. The current GHG emissions are 
already 34% below the emission cap (Figure 1). Stavins (2012) and Environment Northeast (2012) 
point out that a low GHG emission in the RGGI states has originated from three sources: 1) fuel 
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switching from coal to natural gas in electricity generation, 2) the economic recession in 2008, 
and 3) weak electricity demand due to moderate weather conditions in the region.  
The low carbon credit demand weakens the relationship between the RGGI market and 
electricity market, unlike the EU ETS where the carbon trading market is tightly attached to 
energy markets. In sum, this paper has two research goals: 1) investigating the mutual 
relationship between carbon price and energy prices in the northeastern U.S. by discovering the 
main driver of these markets, and in doing so 2) examining whether the RGGI market and other 
energy markets are closely interrelated. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Historical CO2 Emissions in the RGGI Region (Unit: Millions of tons) 
Source: Reproduce Figure 2 in Woods Hole Research Center (WHRC) Addressing greenhouse gas 
emissions through the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, available at 
http://www.whrc.org/policy/rggi.html 
 
 
1.3. Research Question 
Two main research objectives are established. 
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1.3.1. Mutual Relationship among Carbon Price and Energy Prices   
The first goal of the study is to examine the mutual relationship among carbon price and 
energy prices. Specific research questions are as follows: 
 Does the RGGI carbon price interact with other energy prices?  
 If so, how do they interact with each other? 
1.3.2. Differences between EU ETS and RGGI   
The second goal of this research is how the RGGI differs from the EU ETS: 
 What makes the RGGI and the EU ETS different if the patterns of interrelationship 
among carbon and energy prices are different? 
1.4. Organization of the Research 
This study is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides a general introduction and 
research questions. Chapter 2 explains background information. In particular, I explore the cost 
effectiveness of the emissions trading and discuss the RGGI. Chapter 2 also reviews previous 
studies on the GHG emissions trading market. Chapter 3 introduces key variables and the 
research methodology. Chapter 4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes 
this study and outlines possible further studies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EMISSIONS TRADING AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Emissions Trading and the RGGI 
2.1.1. Emissions Trading 
Emissions trading is a market-based approach to control pollution, such as GHG 
emissions, by providing economic incentives to emitters. If pollution emitters exchange their 
emission permits in a market, the emission goal that government sets is achieved at the minimum 
cost. Firms with lower abatement costs will reduce pollutants emissions below their allowance 
and sell their surplus in the emissions trading market. Companies with high abatement cost will 
buy emission permits in the market instead of reducing their emissions by themselves. These 
emission permits will be cleared when permit price is determined by equal market demand.  
2.1.1.1. Theoretical Background of Emissions Trading  
In this section, we will examine the cost effectiveness of emissions trading from a 
theoretical perspective. Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968) developed the idea of emissions trading 
to allocate the emission reduction burden among emitters, and Montgomery (1972) provided a 
proof that emissions trading could be a cost effective way to control pollutants and emissions. 
Consider the following minimization problem based on Tietenberg (2006):  
(1)              , 
(2)                      s. t.                
(3)                      and      
where   refers to emitters, or firms,    is the abatement cost,    is the abatement of emissions of 
the emitter  .   
    and   
   .   in equation (2) is emissions from other sources including 
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natural sources,    is uncontrolled emissions from firm  , and thus          is the total 
emissions from the all emitters.    in equation (2) is the target level of emission or emission goal. 
The first constraint (2) means that the amount of total emissions should be less than the emission 
target level.  
 The Lagrangian of this minimization problem is: 
(4)                                               , 
and Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
(5)                        
          and       
       ] = 0 
(6)                                    and                     
(7)                                             
Lagrange multiplier,  , in equation (5) is the shadow price of the pollution constraint, and this is 
positive value when the pollution constraint is binding. All the marginal abatement costs (MACs) 
of regulated companies have to be equal to  . 
Suppose that this outcome is achieved through an emissions trading market. In this case, 
the amount of emission permit supply will be            . Suppose the amount of initial 
allocation for individual companies is   
 . Then, the total amount of each allocation for all 
companies will be matched with   , that is,        
 . The representative company has the 
following cost minimization problem: 
(8)                                         
  , 
where p is an initial permit price. Then the KT conditions are as follows: 
(9)                      
          and       
       ] = 0, 
(10)                      . 
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Comparing equations (5) and (9), the lowest cost solution will be reproduced when p and   are 
equal.  
2.1.1.2. Elements of Emissions Trading 
The fundamental elements of emissions trading are the emissions target, allocation 
methods, and penalty. An emissions target or a cap,    in equation (2), is essential to the effective 
operation of emissions trading. The emissions target can be set by the control authority (usually a 
governmental or inter-governmental body); however, it can also be set by a private sector group. 
This is the case in a voluntary system like the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX).  
After setting the emissions target, the control authority determines how many allowances 
are distributed to firms. The control authority needs to consider equity and cost effectiveness as 
well as individual firms’ capacity when they distribute the allowance. There are two allocation 
methods, grandfathering and auction. Grandfathering refers to free allocation. More specifically, 
when grandfathering is applied, the amount of allowance is allocated freely based on firm’s 
historical emissions records. Considering the economic impact and adaptation period, most 
carbon emissions trading systems allocate their allowances using grandfathering in early stages. 
In addition to grandfathering, allowances can be distributed by auction. An auction is not a free 
allocation. Emitters participate in an auction
4
 and bid to acquire a given volume of allowances at 
a specified price (European Union 2010). Emitters do not prefer auctions because they have to 
pay to get the allowances. In the case of the EU ETS, all the allowances were allocated with 
                                                     
4
 Emitters do not participate directly in an auction in the EU ETS. Agents bid on behalf of their clients to 
acquire a given volume of allowances at a specified price. 
10 
 
grandfathering in the pilot period, and more than 40% of allowances were allocated through 
auction starting in 2013 (European Commission 2013).
5
  
Both allocation methods have pros and cons. The grandfathering method could act as a 
barrier to new companies entering the market (OECD and IEA 2002); however, when the 
emissions trading is newly introduced, this free allocation method (grandfathering) is commonly 
applied to reduce the impact in the industrial sector. On the other hand, an auction is a burden to 
emitters in comparison to a free allocation method, although if an auction is applied, regulators 
can get additional funds from the auction. 
Penalties are an essential element that makes emissions trading work properly. In the EU 
ETS, a penalty was $40/tCO2e in the pilot period,
6
 and it was increased to $100/tCO2e in Phase II. 
This penalty will be adjusted with the EU consumer price index in Phase III.
7
 
2.1.1.3. Emissions Trading Markets in the World 
Emissions trading has a short history, even though it was proposed in late 1960s by 
Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968). The first emissions trading market was introduced in the U.S. 
to reduce lead in the gasoline refinery industry in 1982 (Ellerman, Joskow, and Harrison 2003). In 
1995 Nitro Oxide (NOx) and Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) emissions trading programs started under the 
Acid Rain Program (ARP) to abate NOx and SO2 emissions from power plants. For GHG 
emissions, the EU ETS is the first and the largest system. Although several voluntary GHG 
                                                     
5
 The share of the auction allocation is different according to sectors and time. For example, the share of an 
auction in the manufacturing industry is 20% in 2013; however, this will increase by up to 70% by 2020. 
On the other hand, only 15% of aviation allowances will be auctioned during the 2013-2020 period (IETA 
2013). 
6
 The penalty is imposed when firms emit more than their allocated emission cap. It is imposed annually: 
the penalty is imposed on 30 April each year for the regulated party’s annual emissions made in the 
previous year (European Union 2010). 
7 Phase I of the EU ETS, between 2005 and 2007, is a pilot period, and Phase II of the EU ETS began in 
2008 and finished in 2012. Phase III will be continued until 2020. 
11 
 
emissions trading markets were introduced, they are small and local. In addition to the EU, six 
other countries (Australia, China, India, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, and Switzerland) and four 
regions in North America (Alberta, California, the RGGI states, and Quebec) are now operating 
GHG emissions trading (International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) fact sheet in 
http://www.ieta.org/worldscarbonmarkets). Emissions trading in South Korea will begin in 2015. 
Table 1 contains emissions trading markets at present around the world. The majority of the 
transactions are being delivered through the EU ETS (World Bank 2012).  
 
 
Table 1. GHG Emissions Trading in the World 
  Time table Target Coverage 
EU 2005-2020 20% below 1990 levels by 
2020 
11,500 Installations  
40% of Total Emissions 
Alberta 2007-Present Annual intensity reduction of 
12% below baseline 
All industrial facilities 
New 
Zealand 
2008-2020 10-20% below 1990 levels by 
2020 
Forestry; Energy Fuels and industrial;  
and Waste and Synthetic 
RGGI 2009-2018 10% below 2014 levels by 
2018 
Power Sector 
India 2012-2015 20-25% intensity reduction 
below 2005 levels by 2020 
Power, thermal, iron and steel, 
fertilizers, textiles, aluminum, pulp  
and paper, chlor-alkali 
California 2013-2020 Reach 1990 levels by 2020 Energy; Industrial Sources; Oil and Gas 
Québec 2013-2020 20% below 1990 levels by 
2020 
Energy; Industrial Sources; Oil and Gas 
Australia 2013-2020 5% below 2000 levels by 
2020 
Energy, Industrial Process, Commercial 
Transport. 
China 2015-2020 
(National 
from 2015) 
Intensity reduction of 40-45% 
below by 2020 
Differs between pilots;  
National coverage unclear 
Kazakhstan 2013-2020 7% below 1990 levels by 
2020 
Oil and gas; power; Mining and Metals; 
Chemicals; others being considered 
Switzerland 2013-2020 20% below 1990 levels by 
2021 
950 companies across multiple sectors 
Tokyo 2013-2019 25% below 2020 levels by 
2020 
1400 Facilities, 20% of Total Emissions 
Korea 2015-2026 30% below BAU by 2020 490 Emitters, 60% of Total Emissions 
Source: Table reproduced from IETA factsheet, available at http://www.ieta.org/worldscarbonmarkets 
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The U.S. has three GHG emissions trading market: The CCX, the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI), and California’s Cap and Trade Program. Among these markets, the CCX, 
which was a voluntary GHG emissions trading market, discontinued operations at the end of 2010 
(Bern 2011). The RGGI and California’s cap and trade program are mandatory markets.  
2.1.2. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
2.1.2.1. What Is RGGI?  
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is the first regulatory GHG cap and 
trade system in the U.S. for nine northeastern states. Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont are now participating.
8
 
Figure 2 shows the geographical location of the RGGI. Grey circles in the map on right show the 
locations of the power plants in the RGGI states. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Geographical Area of the RGGI 
Source: The Woods Hole Research Center (WHRC) (http://www.whrc.org/policy/rggi.html) 
Note: Grey circles in the map show the locations of the power plants in the RGGI states 
 
 
The GHG emissions of the RGGI region accounts for about 10% of total US emissions. 
Currently, fossil fuel power plants with 25 MW or more capacity in electricity generation are 
                                                     
8
 New Jersey participated at the beginning, but it withdrew from the RGGI in 2011. 
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regulated. Besides purchasing allowances, power plants can use up to a 3.3% allowance through 
CO2 Offset to meet their CO2 compliance obligation.
9
 The first permit auction was held in 
September 2008, and the first three-year compliance period began in January 2009 and ended in 
December 2011. 
The scale of the cap was 188 million tCO2e per year during 2009-2011. During the 2012-
2014 period, the cap is 165 million tCO2e per year. The size of the RGGI is relatively small in 
terms of carbon trading volume, with only $249 million worth of transactions in 2011, just 0.2% 
of the EU ETS trading volume (Figure 3). The RGGI trading volume peaked in 2009 and has 
continually decreased since that point, whereas the trading volume in the EU ETS keeps growing. 
Current emissions are already 34% below the emission cap (Environment Northeast 2012). 
Because of the ineffectiveness of this prior emission cap, a new cap will be applied beginning in 
2015. According to RGGI Inc. (2013) the emission cap will be 91 million tCO2e in 2014, and will 
decrease by 2.5% per year for the years 2015 through 2020. 
 
 
Figure 3. Market Sizes between EU ETS and RGGI (Unit: Million USD) 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
                                                     
9
 Five eligible offset project categories follow: 1) Capture or destroy CH4 from landfills; 2) Reduce 
emissions of SF6 from electricity transmission and distribution equipment; 3) Sequester CO2 through 
afforestation; 4) Reduce emissions of CO2 through non-electric end-use energy efficiency in buildings; and 
5) Avoid CH4 emissions through agricultural manure management operations. 
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2.1.2.2. Electricity Generation in RGGI Region 
In nine RGGI states, four fuel sources (natural gas, nuclear, hydroelectric conventional, 
and coal) account for more than 95% of the total electricity generation in 2012 (Figure 4). Among 
these sources, natural gas is the largest source since 2006. Around 45% of electricity in the RGGI 
states is generated by natural gas. The share of coal has been decreasing from 20% in 2001 to less 
than 10% in 2012. Nuclear and hydroelectric conventional energy sources constitute about 40% 
of the electricity generation. The share of the electricity generation by petroleum is below 1% 
since 2010 (Figure 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Fuel Sources for Electricity Generation in RGGI states 
Source: Calculated by the author based on EIA data 
 
 
2.1.2.3. Fuel Switching 
The most prominent observation in Figure 4 derives from fuel switching, which implies 
that natural gas replaces coal. Fuel switching has continually accelerated in the region since the 
introduction of the RGGI in 2009 (Table 2). The share of natural gas increased by 13% from 
2009-2012, and the share of coal decreased by 9% in the RGGI states from 2009-2012. 
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Table 2. Share of Natural Gas and Coal in Electricity Generation in RGGI States (Unit: %) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Gas
1
 23.8  27.3  23.6  23.9  24.9  29.6  31.4  30.5  31.6  35.9  39.1  44.2  
Coal
2
 23.5  23.4  23.5  22.9  21.9  22.7  23.2  21.9  17.9  17.1  12.5  8.4  
Note: 
1
 Percentage share of natural gas in electricity generation in the RGGI region; 
2
 Percentage share of coal in electricity generation in the RGGI region 
 
 
There are various reasons for this fuel switching. A recent low natural gas price caused by 
shale gas development is one of the main reasons. There is an incentive for electricity producers 
to switch their fuel from coal to natural gas. The Acid Rain Program (ARP) may be another 
reason. The ARP requires electricity producers to reduce SO2 and NOx emissions. Natural gas 
emits much lesser SO2 and NOx than coal (Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3. Pollution Emission by Fuel Types at Power Plant in the U.S. 
Fuel type Carbon dioxide (CO2) Sulfur dioxide (SO2) Nitrogen oxides (NOx) 
Natural Gas 1,135 lbs/MWh 0.1 lbs/MWh 1.7 lbs/MWh 
Oil 1,672 lbs/MWh 12 lbs/MWh 4 lbs/MWh 
Coal 2,249 lbs/MWh 13 lbs/MWh 6 lbs/MWh 
Source: EPA website (http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.html) 
 
 
2.2. Literature Review  
As transaction data for carbon trading accumulates, a number of empirical studies on 
emissions trading markets have been published, mostly on the EU ETS. Recent studies can be 
categorized into three groups: 1) testing (cap-and-trade) market efficiency (e.g. Montagnoli and 
de Vries 2010; Conrad, Rittler, and Rotfuß 2012), 2) examining determinants of the carbon price 
(e.g. Mansanet-Bataller, Pardo, and Valor 2007; Alberola, Chevallier, and Chèze 2008; Aatola, 
Ollikainen, and Toppinen 2013), and 3) analyzing dynamic interactions between the carbon 
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market and energy markets (e.g. Fezzi and Bunn 2009; Kirat and Ahamada 2011; Reboredo 2013). 
Among these three categories, two groups (2 and 3) are relevant to this research. 
2.2.1. Market Efficiency Test  
The market is said to be efficient when one cannot consistently obtain returns above the 
market average, especially in finance markets, given the information available at the time the 
investment is made (Fama 1970, 1998). 
Because of the EU ETS’s short history, the market is relatively immature (Montagnoli 
and de Vries 2010). Therefore, there is a necessity to examine the market efficiency test for the 
EU ETS. Montagnoli and de Vries (2010) test the efficient market hypothesis in the market for 
carbon permits in Phase I and Phase II of the EU ETS. The results indicate that Phase I, the trial 
and learning period, was inefficient, whereas the first period under Phase II showed signs of 
restoring market efficiency. The result of this study tells us that as both market participants and 
policymakers learned from the implementation of the EU ETS during the pilot period, the market 
matured in later phases. 
Conrad, Rittler, and Rotfuß (2012) show the EU Allowance (EUA) price reacts to EU 
National Allocation Plan (NAP) announcements by applying the Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) model. In addition, immediate EUA price reactions are 
observed in response to German and U.S. macroeconomic announcements on future economic 
development as well as current economic conditions. This result consistently supports the results 
of Montagnoli and de Vries (2010). From these studies, we discover that the EU ETS is an 
efficient market.  
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2.2.2. Determinants of Carbon Price  
In general the key drivers of the carbon price in an emissions market are energy prices 
such as crude oil, natural gas, coal, and electricity. Weather conditions and policy options, such as 
the emissions target, are also the determinants of the carbon price in the emissions market 
(Chevallier 2012). 
Mansanet-Bataller, Pardo, and Valor (2007) examine which factors might explain daily 
carbon price changes in the EU ETS in 2005. Theirs was the first study considering weather 
factors in an analysis regarding the determinants of carbon price. They applied the Multivariate 
Least Squares Regression model, and their findings denote energy prices for Brent crude oil and 
natural gas were the most decisive elements among carbon price determinants. In addition to 
these energy prices, an unusual temperature event (extremely low temperature) in Germany 
increased the carbon permit price. 
Alberola, Chevallier, and Chèze (2008) extend the Mansanet-Bataller, Pardo, and Valor 
(2007) study with additional observations of the EU ETS through April 2007. The result shows 
that the EU ETS carbon price reacts to energy prices and unexpected temperature changes in the 
winter, which coincides with the results of Mansanet-Bataller, Pardo, and Valor (2007). They also 
found two structural changes (April, 2006 and October, 2006) during Phase I. The two structural 
changes were due to the disclosure of 2005 official emissions data (April, 2006) and the European 
Commission announcement of stricter allocations in Phase II (October, 2006). 
Creti, Jouvetb, and Mignonc (2012) also discuss determinants of the carbon price in the 
EU ETS. Although the purpose of the Creti, Jouvetb, and Mignonc (2012) study is conceptually 
identical to both Mansanet-Bataller, Pardo, and Valor (2007) and Alberola, Chevallier, and Chèze 
(2008), it extends the time period to include Phases II. In particular, this study tests whether the 
carbon price drivers from Phase I still hold in Phase II. They consider energy prices and 
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institutional factors as carbon price determinants. They show the continuation of carbon price 
determinants from Phase I in Phase II using cointegration techniques.  
Aatola, Ollikainen, and Toppinen (2013) also examine carbon price determinants in the 
EU ETS from 2005-2010. This study considers more variables: EUA (the EU ETS allowance 
forward price), electricity price (used in markets such as EEX, German power exchange, and 
Nord Pool), commodities price (i.e. mineral, steel, and paper), the UK gas price, two stock 
variables related with electricity price (a water reservoir in the Nord Pool and UK gas storage 
data), and the economic growth indicator (London stock market index). Their results also show 
that carbon price determinants, such as energy prices, in Phase I continue in Phase II in the EU 
ETS. Through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Vector Autoregression (VAR) methods, they 
conclude that around 40% of the carbon price in the EU ETS can be explained by gas prices, coal 
prices, and Germany’s electricity prices. Among these factors, Germany’s electricity price is the 
most crucial element in the carbon price. 
In sum, various studies have examined price drivers in the EU ETS. According to these 
studies, factors such as energy prices, weather conditions, and institutional factors such as policy 
announcements affect the EU ETS market.  
2.2.3. Dynamic Interactions between Carbon and Energy Markets  
The final vein of empirical studies on carbon emissions trading is an analysis regarding 
interactions between the carbon market and energy markets. These studies have paid more 
attention to the dynamic interrelation between carbon price, energy prices and electricity price. 
Fezzi and Bunn (2009) examine the mutual interaction among three market prices (the 
EUA price, the UK electricity price, and the UK natural gas price) through the Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM). The time frame for this study is restricted to Phase I of the EU ETS. 
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Results show that the UK electricity price increases the EUA price instantly and considerably. In 
turn, the carbon price increases the UK electricity price with a few days lag. This result shows 
that the EU ETS is mutually and strongly related to the electricity market.  
Another research question examines whether or not the EU ETS provides appropriate 
economic incentives. In answer to this query, Kirat and Ahamada (2011) investigate the 
relationship between carbon price in the Phase I of the EU ETS and electricity contracts in France 
and Germany. They applied the multivariate GARCH model. Their results indicate that the 
electricity industry in both France and Germany weakly respond to the EU ETS, with Germany 
having a stronger interdependence. They explain that the reason for this weak response is due to 
the excess allocation of allowances during Phase I. 
Chevallier (2011) constructs a carbon pricing model that considers macroeconomic 
factors, such as the aggregated EU industrial production index. Energy prices (Brent crude oil, 
natural gas, and coal prices) are also considered as main carbon price drivers. Through the 
Markov-switching VAR model,
10
 the interactions between the macroeconomic index and energy 
prices are captured. The result shows that industrial production positively affects the EUA price 
in an economic expansion period (Phase I) and negatively in an economic recession period (Phase 
II). This result is consistent with general intuition, which implies that an increased production 
level brings more CO2 emissions. As a result, this leads to a strong carbon credit demand. 
Reboredo (2013) examines the interdependence between the EUA price and Brent crude 
oil price during the Phase II period. This study applies copula models
11
 to measure dependence 
between these two markets. The results show that the EU ETS price and Brent crude oil price are 
                                                     
10
 The Markov switching VAR model involves multiple structures that can characterize time series 
behaviors in different settings. By permitting switching between these structures, this model is able to 
capture more complex dynamic patterns (Kim and Nelson 1999) 
11
 The copula model measures the dependence among random variables (Schweizer and Wolff 1981).   
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positively related. Additionally, Reboredo (2013) showed that when an investment portfolio 
contains both EU ETS allowances and crude oil, the portfolio reduces risk, making it a useful 
option whereby investors can hedge against that risk. 
Many studies have examined the relationships between the carbon market and energy 
markets. According to these studies, the price of carbon can be explained by the prices of energy 
commodities such as natural gas, oil, coal, and electricity. In addition, the carbon market and the 
electricity market interact with each other, but the magnitude varies depending on the country 
under consideration (the UK has a strongly correlated relationship whereas France and Germany 
are relatively weak).  
Unfortunately, all literature exclusively deals with the EU ETS. As far as I know, there is 
no empirical study on the RGGI. As we discussed in the previous Chapter, the RGGI has different 
characteristics from the EU ETS. As a result, the relationship between the RGGI and U.S. energy 
markets might indicate trends that differ from the EU ETS. Therefore, there is a necessity for 
rigorous study which tests how the RGGI interacts with energy markets. This is the primary 
research question of this study.  
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Based on the discussion in chapter 2, four variables—RGGI carbon prices, electricity 
prices, natural gas prices, and coal prices—are selected to investigate the relationships between 
the RGGI and energy markets.  
3.1. Key Variables and Data Collection 
Natural gas and coal are the main fuel sources used to generate electricity in nine RGGI 
states. Both natural gas and coal accounted for 52% of the total electricity generation in 2012 
(natural gas 44%, and coal 8%). Thus, I include the prices of natural gas and coal as the fuel 
sources in this model. Electricity price is another important variable used to investigate this 
dynamic interrelationship. Oil accounted for less than 1% of the electricity generated in 2012, 
thus it is excluded from the model. 
3.1.1. RGGI Price 
The RGGI price data has been obtained through the RGGI CO2 Allowance Tracking 
System (RGGI COATS). The first allowance auction was held on September 30, 2008, and RGGI 
COATS data starts on that date.
12
 Transactions have occurred irregularly, however. The total 
number of carbon price observations is 204, although carbon allowances had been traded over 
three years.  
Figure 5 shows RGGI carbon prices from September, 2008, to January, 2012. The RGGI 
price stayed around 2-3$/tCO2e. In the early stage of the RGGI, the carbon price was over 
3$/tCO2e. This price has decreased over time, and after 2010 it leveled out at around 2$/ tCO2e.  
                                                     
12
 The first compliance period began on January 1, 2009. 
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Figure 5. RGGI Allowance Price (Unit: $/CO2 ton) 
 
 
3.1.2. Electricity Price 
The U.S. high-voltage electricity system is operated and distributed by individual utilities, 
such as independent system operators (ISO’s) or regional transmission organizations (RTO’s), 
and their power pools. ISOs and RTOs are organizations formed under the direction of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). They coordinate, control, and monitor the 
operation of the electrical power system. In North America, nine ISOs and RTOs distribute 
electricity, and these ISOs and RTOs serve two-thirds of electricity consumers in the U.S. and 
more than 50 % of Canada's population (Figure 6). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  RTOs & ISOs in North America 
Source: Reproduced from the ISO/RTO Council (IRC) 
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Three of these systems (one RTO—PJM and two ISOs—ISO-NE and NYISO) distribute 
electricity in the RGGI region (see Figure 6). PJM covers Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West 
Virginia, and the District of Columbia. ISO New England (ISO-NE) serves Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The New York Independent System 
Operator (NYISO) covers New York State. The electricity prices in these three electric 
transmission systems move together, as shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Electricity Prices in the Three Regions (Unit: $/MMBTU) 
Note: Three electricity distribution systems in the RGGI region are PJM, ISO-NE, and NYISO. PJM covers 
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia. ISO New England (ISO-
NE) serves Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The New 
York Independent System Operator (NYISO) covers New York State 
 
 
The electricity price data for PJM, ISO-NE, and NYISO were collected from the FERC 
database. Electricity price data reflects a Day-Ahead market price.
13
 Due to the irregularity of the 
                                                     
13
 The Day-Ahead Market price is a forward market price for the next operating day, and it is calculated 
based on the generation offers, demand bids, and scheduled bilateral transactions 
(http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/energy/day-ahead.aspx).   
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RGGI transaction data, these daily wholesale prices are adjusted to the corresponding transaction 
date of the allowance trade in the RGGI. The electricity price series is the simple average of these 
three electric transmission systems, ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM. Note that some of the data in 
PJM is excluded because some regions in PJM system are located outside of the RGGI region 
(e.g. Commonwealth Edison covers Illinois while Dominion covers Virginia and North Carolina). 
Electricity prices fluctuate due to seasonality caused mainly by cooling demand in the summer 
and heating demand in the winter (Figure 8).  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Electricity Price (Unit: $/MMBTU) 
Note: Simple average of three electricity Day-Ahead prices in ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM. 
 
 
3.1.3. Natural Gas and Coal Prices  
The natural gas price is the daily futures price of Henry Hub Gulf Coast in the New York 
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). Natural gas price data is compiled from the Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development at Iowa State University (CARD). Dates of the natural gas 
price are adjusted to correspond with the transaction dates of the RGGI (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Natural Gas and Coal Price (Unit: $/MMBTU) 
 
 
The coal price is the daily futures price of Central Appalachian, which is also traded 
through NYMEX. Coal price data was compiled by the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA). 
Coal prices are adjusted to correspond with the transaction dates of the RGGI (Figure 9). As 
illustrated in Figure 9, the natural gas price has been historically higher than that of coal; however, 
(grey boxed area in Figure 9) the price gap between natural gas and coal has recently narrowed 
and even reversed. 
Table 4 contains basic data statistics, specifications, and their sources. The unit of 
electricity price is $/MWh, coal $/short ton, and natural gas $/MMBTU.
14
 Those three different 
units are converted to $/MMBTU. As shown in Figure 5, Figure 8, and Figure 9, electricity price, 
natural gas price, and coal price move together.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
14
 MMBTU stands for million British thermal unit. The BTU (or Btu) is a traditional unit of energy equal to 
about 1,055 joules. 
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Table 4: Data Statistics, Specification, and Sources 
 RGGI price Electricity price Natural Gas price Coal price 
 ($/ton of CO2) ($/MMBTU) ($/MMBTU) ($/MMBTU) 
Observations 204 204 204 204 
Mean 2.49 13.76 4.09 3.10 
Std. Dev. 0.78 4.44 1.01 0.60 
Minimum 1.80 7.44 2.06 2.17 
Maximum 6.00 34.11 7.17 5.81 
Time Period September 30, 2008 ~ February 28, 2012 
Specification 
RGGI allowance 
price data 
Day-Ahead Prices in 
the RGGI region: 
ISO-NE, NYISO, and 
PJM 
Futures price of the 
nearby contracts from 
NYMEX 
Futures price of 
Central Appalachian, 
nearby contracts from 
NYMEX 
Data source RGGI COATS 
Federal Energy 
Regulatory 
Commission 
Center for 
Agricultural and 
Rural Development – 
Iowa State University 
U.S. Energy 
Information 
Agency 
 
 
3.2. Methodology 
A Vector Autoregression (VAR) and an Error Correction Model (ECM) are commonly 
applied in previous literature to analyze the vector of time series and capture the dynamic 
interrelationship among the variables considered. In this study, the Lag Augmented Vector 
Autoregression (LA-VAR), which is a modified version of the VAR model introduced by Toda 
and Yamamoto (1995), is applied to perform the econometric analysis.  
There are two reasons why the LA-VAR model is applied instead of the VAR or the 
ECM model. Firstly, the LA-VAR captures the dynamic interrelationship between variables 
considered regardless of their stationarity (Kurozumi and Yamamoto 2000). Secondly, the LA-
VAR has better size stability than ECM (Dolado and Lutkepohl 1996; Zapata and Rambaldi 1997; 
Giles and Mirza 1999; Giles 2002). In other words, the LA-VAR captures the dynamic 
interrelationship between variables better than ECM in a small sample. 
27 
 
3.2.1. Multivariate Time-Series Model: VAR  
A VAR model was introduced by Sims (1980). The model describes the evolution of a set 
of k variables over the sample period as a linear function of only their past values. A VAR (p), 
with k variables, can be written as follows: 
(11) tptpttt eyAyAyAAy   22110 , 
where    is a k × 1 column vector,    is a k × 1 vector of constants,    is a collection 
of k × k matrices of parameters, and    is a k × 1 error term (also called innovation). The optimal 
lag length, p, can be determined using information criteria, such as the Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC).  
3.2.2. Stationary Test
15
 
Stationarity is an essential underlying concept for time-series econometric analysis. If a 
time-series’ data is not stationary, consistent estimators cannot be obtained. The time-series data, 
  , is stationary if its first two moments are finite and constant over time, meaning that neither the 
mean nor the autocovariance depend on the date   (Hamilton 1994). Mathematically,         
and                      for all   and  , where    is the autocovariance between    and 
    . 
Stationarity of the time-series data is important because estimates are not consistent with 
non-stationary series. A property of a stationary process is mean-reverting, indicating it will 
fluctuate around its mean, estimates remaining consistent. In addition, a non-stationary series 
causes a spurious regression problem. If two variables are trending over time, a regression of one 
on the other could have a high R
2
 value even if the two series are unrelated.  
                                                     
15
 The theoretical background in this section is referenced from Gujarati (2003). 
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To test whether the time-series data is stationary, the unit root test is widely used.  
Equation (12) is the random walk model: 
(12) 11    ,1    ttt uyy , 
where    is a white noise error term. When   =1, implying the existence of a unit root, becomes a 
random walk model without drift, indicating a non-stationary stochastic process. If we regress    
on its lagged value      and the estimated   is not statistically different from 1, then    is non-
stationary. 
The Dickey-Fuller (DF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are well-known and commonly 
applied methods to test for the unit root. In these tests, the null hypothesis is that the series has a 
unit root, i.e., H0:    . If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the data series is stationary. The 
DF test is based on estimating the equation (12) by ordinary least squares, and thus it may suffer 
from a serial correlation problem. The Augmented DF test adds the lagged difference terms of the 
regressand to adjust for the serial correlation. The PP test uses an alternative method to account 
for the serial correlation problem. The PP test uses Newey–West (1987) standard errors to deal 
with serial correlation problem in the innovation term.
16
 The lag length (or bandwidth) for the PP 
test is determined using the formula             where T is the sample size as suggested in 
Newey and West (1994), which is 4 for the variables. However, choosing the lag length this way 
is not necessarily optimal (Hoechle 2007). In this study the PP test is implemented for the unit 
root test through STATA software. Results are reported in Table 5. The PP adjusted τ test statistic 
of natural gas is given by -2.527 (fail to reject) and it implies that natural gas is non stationary. 
                                                     
16
 When we have serial correlation problem, we can use New-West standard error to make robust serial 
correlation standard error. Newey-West standard error is constructed by  
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    , 
where               ,   is the ith row of the X matrix, n is the number of observations, k is the number 
of predictors, m is the lag length, and       is the White formulation and this White formulation can only 
take care of heteroskedasticity.   
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Null hypotheses for RGGI and ELEC are rejected at 1% significance level, and null hypothesis 
for COAL is rejected at 5% significance level. In sum, RGGI carbon price, electricity prices, and 
coal prices are stationary, but natural gas prices are non-stationary. 
 
 
Table 5. Results of Phillips-Perron Tests 
 RGGI ELEC GAS COAL 
Z(rho) -21.418 -44.731 -11.336 -11.809 
Z(t) -3.563*** -5.070*** -2.527 -3.418** 
10% Critical Value -2.573 -2.573 -2.573 -2.573 
5% Critical Value -2.883 -2.883 -2.883 -2.883 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) 0.007 0.000 0.109 0.010 
No. of Lags 4 4 4 4 
No. of Obs. 204 204 204 204 
Note: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% significance levels 
1. Z(rho) is the Phillips-Perron ρ test statistic, and Z(t) is the Phillips-Perron adjusted τ test statistic for the 
coefficient of ρ in the equation (12). These statistics are calculated as following formulas:    
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    ,where    is the OLS residual, k is the number of covariates in the 
regression, q is the number of Newey-West lags to use in calculating    
 , and    is the OLS standard error of 
  . 
2. P-values are based on the MacKinnon approximate for Z(t). There was no standard asymptotic 
distribution to test a unit root. MacKinnon (1994) calculated asymptotic distribution function, and with the 
result of the study, P-value can be applied. 
3. If null hypothesis is rejected, then the series is stationary. 
 
 
3.2.3. Lag Augmented Vector Autoregression (LA-VAR) 
Although a VAR model has been applied abundantly in many studies, it has some 
limitations. A VAR model cannot capture dynamic interrelationships when a data series is not 
stationary. An Error Correction Model (ECM) or LA-VAR then needs to be applied to test a 
dynamic interrelationship for a non-stationary data series. In the LA-VAR model, additional lag 
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is added to the VAR model. For this reason, before implementing the LA-VAR model, optimal 
lag length has to be determined.  
3.2.4. Deciding Optimal Lag Length 
Toda and Yamamoto (1995) involves the estimation of an LA-VAR (p + dmax) model 
where p is the optimal lag length of the VAR system and dmax is the maximal order of integration 
of the variables in the system. The order of integration is the minimum number of times a series 
must be differenced to make it stationary. To decide the lag length of the LA-VAR model, we 
need to find p and dmax. 
When too many lags are applied, the error in the forecasts will be bigger. On the contrary, 
if too few lags are applied, this could leave out relevant information. Therefore, applying optimal 
lag length is important. The optimal lag length, p, can be determined by minimizing the following 
information criteria:  Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), 
and the Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQIC). These information criteria contain both the goodness of 
fit of the model and the complexity of the model. Each of the information criterions are defined as 
follows: 
(13)  AIC =   
  
 
  
   
 
 
(14)  SIC =   
  
 
  
      
 
   
(15)  HQIC =   
  
 
  
           
 
   
where    is the total number of parameters in the model, LL is the value of the log likelihood 
function, and T is the number of observations. For the equations (13) - (15), the first term, -
2(LL/T) indicates an estimate of the deviance of the fit of the model, and the second term of each 
equation indicates the degree to which the number of model parameters is being penalized. The 
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optimal lag length, p, is chosen to minimize these information criteria. The results of those 
information criteria values, which were obtained by using STATA, are in Table 6. 
There is a confliction in these results: HQIC and SIC indicate one lag is the optimal lag 
length, whereas AIC tells us three is optimal. According to Koop (2006), this confliction occurs 
often in practice, and there is no specific rule to select optimal lag length with such confliction in 
the information criteria values. Two out of the three information criteria in Table 6 suggest that 
the optimal lag length of the VAR is to be one.
17
  
 
 
Table 6. Information Criteria Values for Lag Order Selection in VAR 
Lag AIC HQIC SIC 
0 -1.36 -1.34 -1.30 
1 -7.44 -7.31* -7.11* 
2 -7.51 -7.27 -6.92 
3 -7.62* -7.27 -6.76 
4 -7.56 -7.10 -6.43 
5 -7.56 -7.00 -6.17 
Note: The minimum values of AIC, HQIC, and SIC determine the optimal lag length of the VAR system. 
Those minimum values are indicated by * in this table. 
 
 
The natural gas price series is non-stationary, as shown in section 3.2.2. The first 
differenced natural gas price is stationary based on the PP test result. The maximal order of 
integration of the natural gas price, therefore, is one. Thus, the optimal lag length of the LA-VAR 
model is two. 
                                                     
17
 According to Lütkepohl (2005), AIC often shows inconsistent results with the other information criteria 
and unnecesarily extends the length of lag. 
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3.2.5. Final Model 
Let    represent a vector of energy prices at time t, as follows: 
  
                                  , where       is the RGGI carbon allowance price,       
stands for the electricity price,      is the natural gas price, and       is the coal price, 
respectively. The LA-VAR with the two time lags is then given by the following: 
(16) tttt eyAyAAy   22110 ,  
where   ,   , and    are the corresponding coefficients vectors, and    is a vector of 
innovations.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Empirical Results 
4.1.1. Estimation Results  
The estimation results of the LA-VAR are presented in Appendix A. The individual 
estimated coefficients of the LA-VAR are not easy to interpret. Impulse response functions (IRF) 
are used to interpret these results (Gujarati 2003, p. 853). A Granger causality test is another way 
to interpret results.  
4.1.2. Granger Causality 
A variable    Granger causes a variable    if past values of    are useful for predicting 
   (Granger, 1969). A common method for testing Granger causality is to regress    on its own 
lagged values and on lagged values of    to test the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients 
on the lagged values of    are jointly zero. Rejecting the null hypothesis means    Granger 
causes   . Table 7 presents pair-wise Granger causality tests results obtained by STATA software.  
Consider the results of the four tests for the first equation in Table 7. The first is a Wald 
test
18
 wherein the coefficients of the ELEC that appear in the equation for RGGI are jointly zero. 
The null hypothesis that ELEC does not Granger cause RGGI cannot be rejected. Similarly, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the GAS in the equation for RGGI are 
jointly zero, so we cannot reject the hypothesis that GAS does not Granger cause RGGI. We can 
reject the null hypothesis of the third test that the coefficients of the COAL in the equation for 
                                                     
18
 The Wald test, which is asymptotic version of F-test, is a way regarding testing the significance of 
specific dependent variables in a model. If Wald test is significant for a particular explanatory variable, 
then we would conclude that the parameters associated with these variables are not zero, so that the 
variables should be included in the model (Kyngäs and Rissanen 2001). 
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RGGI are jointly zero. Therefore, COAL Granger causes RGGI. The fourth test is with respect to 
the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all the other endogenous variables are jointly zero. 
Because this can be rejected, we can reject the null hypothesis that ELEC, GAS, and COAL do 
not Granger cause RGGI.  
The other test results in Table 7 can be interpreted in a similar way. In sum, the results 
show that the RGGI allowance price and coal price Granger cause bilaterally, and natural gas 
price Granger causes electricity price. 
 
 
Table 7. The Result of Granger Causality Wald Tests 
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
RGGI ELEC 3.576 2 0.167 
RGGI GAS 1.075 2 0.584 
RGGI COAL 18.422 2 0.000 
ELEC RGGI 1.248 2 0.536 
ELEC GAS 29.031 2 0.000 
ELEC COAL 3.580 2 0.167 
GAS RGGI 2.868 2 0.238 
GAS ELEC 0.148 2 0.929 
GAS COAL 0.289 2 0.865 
COAL RGGI 8.039 2 0.018 
COAL ELEC 0.320 2 0.852 
COAL GAS 0.741 2 0.690 
Note: Null hypothesis “excluded” does not cause “equation.”  
 
 
4.1.3. Impulse Response Function 
An Impulse Response Function (IRF) shows responses of variables to a one-time only 
shock to the innovation of a variable holding all other innovations constant. A one-time only 
shock is a positive shock of magnitude equal to one standard deviation of the innovation applied 
in the contemporaneous period (Hamilton 1994, p. 318). Suggested by Swanson and Granger 
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(1997), the moving average representation (MA) is derived from the estimated LA-VAR in 
equation (16) such that           
 
   . The IRF is defined as          .
19
 The IRF results 
were obtained by using STATA software. 
4.1.3.1. Impact on RGGI 
The IRF for the impulse on RGGI to energy markets are presented in Figure 10. Solid 
lines are impulse responses and dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals. If there is a positive 
external shock in the RGGI (in other words, an increase in permit price), then coal price will 
decrease. When permits become expensive, there is an incentive for power companies to reduce 
carbon emissions. There might be two choices:  reducing electricity generation or switching fuel 
to a cleaner energy source (natural gas). In either case, the coal demand becomes weak and coal 
prices decrease.  
It is not clear how demand for natural gas reacts to an external shock in the RGGI price. 
Due to fuel switching, natural gas demand may become strong, indicating expectations for a 
subsequent rise in natural gas prices. On the other hand, the companies who have used natural gas 
to generate electricity will reduce their natural gas consumption and lower their carbon emissions 
as permits become more expensive. The IRF in Figure 10 suggests that the gas price will increase, 
but not in a statistically significant manner.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
19 Many previous empirical studies have used an arbitrary ordering of variables in    to perform IRF, 
based on theory, expert opinions, or Choleski decomposition. The ordering of the variables in this study is 
RGGI, ELEC, GAS, and COAL. 
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RGGI → ELEC RGGI → GAS RGGI → COAL 
   
Figure 10. Impulse Response Functions (Impulse from RGGI Price to other Energy Markets) 
 
 
When permit prices increase, power companies have two choices:  reducing electricity 
generation to avoid the extra burden of buying another permit, or raising electricity prices to pass 
the burden on to consumers. Either case increases electricity price; however, the result of IRF 
shows that the electricity price will increase in the short term, but it will soon decrease, although 
this result is not statistically significant. 
4.1.3.2. Impact on Energy Markets 
The results for how the RGGI price reacts to an external shock on energy prices are 
presented in Figure 11. If the electricity price increases, permit prices in the RGGI market also 
increase, but this effect goes away quickly. By intuition we can conjecture that when electricity 
price goes up, power companies generate more electricity and emit more carbon. This leads to 
higher permit prices due to strong permit demand. Note that this is different from the results for 
the EU ETS discussed earlier.  
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ELEC → RGGI GAS → RGGI COAL→ RGGI 
   
Figure 11. Impulse Response Functions (Impulse from Energy Prices to RGGI Prices) 
 
 
With increases in the natural gas price, permit prices in the RGGI will also increase. In 
this case, electricity producers may use more coal than natural gas. This leads to an increase in 
carbon emissions and leads to high permit demand. Electricity producers purchase more permits 
in such a situation. 
Lastly, if there is a positive external shock in the coal price (if the coal price rises for 
some reason), then permit prices in the RGGI will decrease. This is because electricity producers 
may substitute coal with natural gas, which is relatively cheaper. Natural gas includes far less 
carbon, so carbon emissions will be reduced. In turn, it weakens the demand for carbon permits, 
and permit prices in the RGGI will subsequently decrease. 
4.1.3.3. Impact on Other Markets 
The other IRF results are presented in Appendix B. Interpretations are as follows: 
 Coal price increases both electricity price and natural gas price (second and third IRF 
in the first row in B-1 in Appendix B.) 
 Increased natural gas price leads to increase electricity price (second IRF in the third 
row in B-1in Appendix B.) 
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 Coal price does not respond to any changes in RGGI natural gas and electricity prices 
(the first column in B-1in Appendix B.) 
 A positive shock in electricity price does not affect either coal price or natural gas 
price (first and third IRFs in the second row in B-1in Appendix B.) 
4.2. Discussion 
The RGGI carbon price and electricity price are not closely related, as shown in Figure 
10 and Figure 11. This is against our intuition because GHG regulation causes the additional cost 
burden on electricity generation, and, therefore, electricity price should rise. This unexpected 
discrepancy could be explained by fuel switching. In the RGGI states, natural gas is the largest 
fuel source to generate electricity in the time period 2005-2006, and its consumption keeps 
growing. In the same time period, coal consumption was decreasing (Figure 12). The main reason 
to switch fuel is that natural gas is relatively cheap. After the introduction of the RGGI in 2009, 
this fuel switching was accelerated because the RGGI carbon policy made natural gas more 
attractive. This is obvious when we plot the Dark Spark Spread (DSS) and Clean Spark Spread 
(CSS) as shown in Figure 13. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Share of Coal and Natural Gas in Electricity Generation in RGGI States 
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The spark spread is a measure of a power plant’s profitability from selling a unit of 
electricity (Alberola, Chevallier, and Chèze 2008). The DSS is the gross margin of a coal-fired 
power plant, and the CSS is the gross margin of a gas-fired power plant (Alberola, Chevallier, 
and Chèze 2008). Spark spread is defined as follows: 
(17)                      
     
     
               ,  
where       is the efficiency of fuels (or the heat rate) and       is the emission coefficient (U.S. 
Energy Information Agency 2013). 
Power plants will tend to choose the higher spark spread of two options, and natural gas 
has a higher spark spread than coal since September 2008. Fuel switching implies low GHG 
emissions, especially regarding CO2, without burdening electricity generation. This is because 
natural gas has a lower emission coefficient and, in turn, generates a weak carbon credit demand 
in the RGGI. In fact, RGGI emissions fell an average of 34% below the cap during 2009 - 2011. 
A loose relationship between the RGGI and the electricity market could occur due to the recent 
dominant occurrence of fuel switching in RGGI region.
20
 The power industry in the RGGI region 
responds to energy markets, especially the natural gas market; however, it does not respond 
strongly to the RGGI market, and these relationships are logically acceptable. 
 
                                                     
20
 There are three options for transitioning from existing coal-fired boilers to natural gas (B & W Power 
Generation Group 2010). First, the power industry could switch the fuel by modification of an existing 
boiler. This option implies the partial modification of existing boilers in addition to some operational 
changes such as sootblowing schedule changes. Second, they could add a gas turbine to the existing boiler 
cycle. This option involves the addition of another gas turbine to an existing plant. The last option is to 
construct a new plant to replace an existing coal plant. This last option appears to be the most probable 
method because 73% of the U.S. coal-fired plants currently have exceeded their expected life span (30 
year). In fact, U.S. Energy Information Agency (2014) projects roughly 20% (a total of 60 GW of capacity) 
of coal-fired power plants will be retired by 2020. Natural gas generating plants can be constructed more 
quickly than coal-fired generation plants. The specifics of construction time are as follows: simple cycle 
plants can typically be constructed in 18 to 30 months. Combined cycle plants can be constructed in about 
36 months. These lead times are less than the average for coal plants, which take about 72 months to 
construct. 
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Figure 13. Dark and Clean Spark Spread 
Note: The spark spread is a measure of a power plant’s profitability from selling a unit of electricity. The 
Dark Spark Spread (DSS) is the gross margin of a coal-fired power plant, and the Clean Spark Spread (CSS) 
is the gross margin of a gas-fired power plant. The power plant will choose the higher spark spread. 
 
 
To distinguish the low gas price effect and the positive carbon permit price effect in fuel 
switching, a simple regression model was run. The regression model is as follows: 
(18)                                                                  , 
where Sharegas refers to the share of natural gas in electricity generation in the RGGI region, Pgas 
refers to the natural gas price, RGGI refers to the RGGI dummy, PgasRGGI refers to an 
interaction term, and Summer is the seasonal trend dummy (for June – August). To this regression 
analysis, monthly data was applied for the period March 2005 – December 2012, and the number 
of observations was 94.   
OLS estimates are no longer efficient when we have a serial correlation problem, i. e. 
                . To test the existence of a serial correlation problem, the Durbin-Watson d 
Test statistic was calculated using STATA software. The equation for the Durbin-Watson d Test 
statistic is as follows: 
(19)     
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where T refers to the number of time periods and    refers to residuals. The Durbin-Watson d 
Test statistic value was 0.760. This result implies that positive serial correlation exists. When we 
have positive serial correlation, estimates of the standard errors are smaller than the true standard 
errors. This serial correlation problem was fixed by regression with the Newey-West Standard 
Error.
21
 The result is presented in Table 8. 
 
 
Table 8. Results of Regression Model to Test Fuel Switching  
Sharegas        Coef. Newey-West Std. Err. T-stat 
Constant  35.369*** 3.133 11.290 
Pgas  -0.948  ** 0.390 -2.430 
RGGI  18.342*** 4.300 4.270 
Pgas ⋅ RGGI   -3.647*** 0.808 
-4.510 
Summer 5.828*** 1.236 4.710 
R
2
 0.641  
F 39.670 Prob > F = 0.000 
No. of Obs. 94  
*** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% significance levels 
1
 The standard errors are biased when serial correlation is present. Test for serial correlation: Durbin-
Watson d-statistic = 0.760. To fix this serial correlation problem, Newey-West standard errors was applied. 
2
 Sharegas refers to the share of natural gas in electricity generation in the RGGI region, Pgas refers to the 
natural gas price, RGGI refers to the RGGI dummy, PgasRGGI refers to an interaction term, and Summer is 
the seasonal trend dummy. 
 
 
The dummy variables for the RGGI and trend during summer season have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the share of natural gas in electricity generation in the RGGI 
region. In other words, after the introduction of the RGGI and during the summer season (June – 
August), the share of natural gas in electricity generation in the RGGI region increased. Pgas has a 
negative effect on the share of natural gas in electricity generation in the RGGI region. This result 
is obvious:  when natural gas price increases, then natural gas demand weakens. When we 
                                                     
21
 As we discussed in the previous chapter, we can use Newey-West standard error to make robust standard 
error when we have serial correlation problem. 
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consider the interaction term effect, the absolute number of the coefficient increases by 3.65. This 
indicates that the RGGI has accelerated fuel switching. 
To see more detail on the elasticity of the linear combination term, elasticity at the means 
before and after the RGGI introduction is calculated as follows: 
(20)                   
         
     
 
          
                     
     
          
                     
  
= - 0.17 (95% confidence interval: -0.30, -0.03), 
(21)                  
         
     
 
          
                     
           
          
                     
  
= - 0.81 (95% confidence interval: -1.06, -0.57), 
where β1 is the estimated coefficient of natural gas price, and β3 is the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction term.  
Elasticity at the means changes from -0.17 to -0.81 after the introduction of the RGGI. 
The result of the calculation tells us that if natural gas price decreased by 10%, the share of 
natural gas electricity generation would increase by 1.7%. When the interaction term effect is 
considered, this situation changes. If natural gas price decreased by 10%, the share of natural gas 
electricity generation would increase by 8.1%. In other words, the share of natural gas more 
increases than without interaction term considered. The fact that accelerated fuel switching with 
the introduction of the RGGI is verified.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE STUDIES 
There have been numerous studies in relation to carbon permit prices in the greenhouse 
gas emissions trading market and energy markets such as electricity, natural gas, coal, and crude 
oil. Most previous studies have focused on the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) since its creation in 2005. Notable findings indicate that the EU ETS carbon permit price 
and energy prices are closely interrelated, and crude oil and electricity prices are the main drivers 
of the carbon permit price. Our attention then moves to another emissions trading market in the 
U.S., the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which began in January 2009 for nine 
northeastern U.S. states. The RGGI is the first regulatory carbon cap-and-trade system in the U.S. 
To my best knowledge, there has been no rigorous empirical study on the RGGI.  
The primary research objective of this study is to investigate the mutual relationship 
between the RGGI carbon price and energy prices in the northeastern U.S. To capture the mutual 
relationship among the prices for the RGGI, electricity, natural gas, and coal markets, the Lag 
Augmented Vector Autoregression (LA-VAR) model is applied. The impulse response function 
results suggest that mutual relations between the RGGI allowance price and the electricity market 
exist, although they are weak (and statistically insignificant). This implies that these markets are 
not closely attached to each other. The impulse response function also suggests that the natural 
gas price has positive impacts on the RGGI price, but the RGGI market does not influence the 
natural gas price. In addition, it tells us that RGGI prices and coal prices negatively interact with 
each other. 
The key findings of this study state that 1) the RGGI market and electricity market in the 
RGGI region are not closely tied, unlike the EU ETS. This loose relationship between the two 
44 
 
markets can be explained by the recent weak carbon credit demand stemming from low GHG 
emissions. These low GHG emissions result from fuel switching from coal to natural gas due to 
recent low natural gas prices. 2) Natural gas is the main driver of the RGGI system. 
Based on the findings of this study, we discover the following two policy implications. 
First, there have been concerns as to whether the RGGI market actually works. Despite these 
concerns, the RGGI has been working to reduce GHG emissions through fuel switching. The 
RGGI has accelerated fuel switching. Second, the newly reduced emission cap, which will apply 
starting in 2015, might make the relationship between the RGGI and energy markets stronger. 
Further fuel switching, however, might make the relationship between the RGGI and electricity 
markets weaker. Therefore, when we consider the possibility of these conflicting effects in the 
second policy implication, the relationship between the RGGI and electricity markets warrants 
future study.    
Regrettably, this empirical work has some limitations. First of all, transaction periods in 
the RGGI market were irregular. Usually, transforming the data into an evenly spaced series 
through the use of interpolation can solve an unevenly spaced time series problem. Unfortunately, 
because the sample size of RGGI transaction data is limited, it cannot be fixed by this kind of 
revision. Thus, the unevenly spaced time series data was applied. Another limitation of this work 
is the omission of the ARP allowance price. As discussed in a previous chapter, natural gas emits 
much smaller levels of SO2 and NOx than coal; therefore, adding this variable can perhaps better 
explain the relationships between the RGGI and energy markets. Lastly, external effects including 
electricity import from neighbor states are not considered in this study. The RGGI imposes a 
GHG abatement duty only on the power plants in the RGGI region. This regulation of the power 
industry might expedite the movement of power plants to other regions. In addition, the electricity 
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imported from nearby states could increase. This kind of impact, however, was not considered in 
this study.   
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Appendix A The Completes Result of the VAR Estimation 
VAR estimation results are presented in Table A-1. 
 
 
Table A-1. VAR Estimation Results 
Vector autoregression    
Sample: Sep, 2008- Jan, 2012 No. of obs      =       202 
Log likelihood   =  790.124                          AIC            = -7.467 
FPE                    =  6.72e-09                          HQIC            = -7.228 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  4.71e-09                         SBIC             = -6.877 
      
Equation Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P>chi2 
Ln_RGGI 9 0.136 0.767 664.228 0 
Ln_ELEC 9 0.175 0.632 347.286 0 
Ln_GAS 9 0.088 0.876 1420.99 0 
Ln_COAL 9 0.040 0.958 4558.729 0 
      
 
RGGI Equation 
 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Ln_RGGI 
       
 Ln_RGGI 
      
 L1. 0.456  0.062  7.360 0.000 0.335  0.578  
 L2. 0.372  0.062  5.970 0.000 0.250  0.494  
 Ln_ELEC 
      
 L1. 0.086  0.057  1.520 0.129 -0.025  0.197  
 L2. -0.097  0.056  -1.730 0.084 -0.207  0.013  
 Ln_GAS 
      
 L1. 0.035  0.116  0.300 0.762 -0.193  0.263  
 L2. 0.027  0.121  0.230 0.820 -0.210  0.265  
 Ln_COAL 
      
 L1. -0.920  0.215  -4.280 0.000 -1.340  -0.499  
 L2. 0.807  0.203  3.980 0.000 0.409  1.204  
 _cons 0.210  0.108  1.930 0.053 -0.003  0.422  
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ELEC Equation 
 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Ln_ELEC 
       
 Ln_RGGI 
      
 L1. 0.051  0.080  0.640 0.520 -0.105  0.208  
 L2. -0.087  0.080  -1.090 0.276 -0.244  0.070  
 Ln_ELEC 
      
 L1. 0.503  0.073  6.900 0.000 0.360  0.646  
 L2. -0.017  0.072  -0.240 0.813 -0.158  0.124  
 Ln_GAS 
      
 L1. 0.479  0.150  3.200 0.001 0.186  0.772  
 L2. -0.099  0.156  -0.640 0.524 -0.404  0.206  
 Ln_COAL 
      
 L1. -0.206  0.276  -0.740 0.456 -0.747  0.336  
 L2. 0.326  0.261  1.250 0.212 -0.185  0.837  
 _cons 0.696  0.140  4.990 0.000 0.423  0.970  
 
 
GAS Equation 
 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Ln_GAS 
       
 Ln_RGGI 
      
 L1. -0.059  0.040  -1.470 0.142 -0.137  0.020  
 L2. 0.066  0.040  1.660 0.098 -0.012  0.145  
 Ln_ELEC 
      
 L1. -0.008  0.036  -0.220 0.829 -0.079  0.064  
 L2. -0.006  0.036  -0.170 0.864 -0.077  0.065  
 Ln_GAS 
      
 L1. 0.970  0.075  12.960 0.000 0.824  1.117  
 L2. -0.029  0.078  -0.380 0.705 -0.182  0.123  
 Ln_COAL 
      
 L1. 0.074  0.138  0.530 0.594 -0.197  0.345  
 L2. -0.069  0.131  -0.530 0.598 -0.325  0.187  
 _cons 0.101  0.070  1.440 0.149 -0.036  0.238  
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COAL Equation 
 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Ln_COAL 
       
 Ln_RGGI 
      
 L1. -0.024  0.018  -1.340 0.180 -0.060  0.011  
 L2. -0.012  0.018  -0.670 0.501 -0.048  0.023  
 Ln_ELEC 
      
 L1. 0.009  0.017  0.550 0.586 -0.023  0.041  
 L2. -0.002  0.016  -0.140 0.891 -0.034  0.030  
 Ln_GAS 
      
 L1. 0.029  0.034  0.860 0.391 -0.037  0.096  
 L2. -0.027  0.035  -0.780 0.436 -0.097  0.042  
 Ln_COAL 
      
 L1. 0.809  0.063  12.920 0.000 0.686  0.932  
 L2. 0.136  0.059  2.290 0.022 0.020  0.251  
 _cons 0.072  0.032  2.280 0.023 0.010  0.134  
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Appendix B Impulse Response Function 
Full impulse response function results are presented in B-1. 
 
B-1. Impulse Response Functions Results 
Note: 
1
 The IRFs illustrate how individual data series respond to a positive shock (an increase in price) in 
each of the variables over time. 
2
 RGGI represents the RGGI allowance price; ELEC represents the electricity price; GAS represents the 
natural gas price; and COAL represents the coal price. 
3
 Grey areas are 95% confidence intervals.  
